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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD J. YOUNG,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

t

l

v.
Case No.
JULIA 1\1. 13ARNEY and UTAH ( 10519
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for the death
of plaintiff's four-year-old child, who was killed as a
result of being struck by an automobile driven by the
defendant Julia 1\1. Barney and after the defendant's
insurance company entered the case through its attorney
and took control of the defense, the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint JOmmg the defendant insurance

1

company as a defendant and alleging a cause of action
against said defendant insmancc company on its polic\·
of insurance covering the indi,irlual defendant.
.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The defendants filed a motion Lo dismiss the amended complaint and this motioll was granted by the trial
court as to the defendant insurance company. The
court also denied plaintiff's motion for production of
the policy of insurance upon which the amended complaint was based.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of dis·
missal and order denying plaintiffs motion for produc·
tion of the policy of insurance and an order remanding
the case for trial against both defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff initiated this action to recover damages
for the death of his four-year-old chil<l who was killed
as a result of being struck by an automobile driven by
the defendant Julia l\'l. Barney. After the original
complaint had been filed, it became apparent that the
defendant driver was insured b~' the Utah Farm Bureau
Insurance Company. The insurance company appar·
ently pursuant to the provisions of a liability insurance

policy, issued for and on behalf of the defendant Julia
l\l. Barney, proceeded to defend the ch·iver.
In vie1y of the foregoing, plaintiff, pursuant to
leave of court, filed an amended complaint designating
the Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, a corporation, as a defendant and prayed judgment against
defendants and each of them.
In the amended complaint (R7) the plaintiff
alleged that defendant .Tulia 1\1. Barney was insolvent;
that said defendant was insured under a liability insurance policy issued by the defendant insurance company
to Yon B. Barney, the husband of the defendant Julia
.i\I. Barney.
It was further alleged that by the terms of said
policy the defendant company bound itself to pay all
damages which the insured under sai<l policy became
obligated to pay because of bodily injury including
death at. any time suffered therefrom sustained by any
person caused by or arising out of the use of the automobile referred to in the policy.
It was further alleged that the insurance policy
expressly provided that the term "insured" included
any person while using the automobile with the permission of Von B. Barney.
It was further alleged that the automobile referred
to in the insurance policy was the same automobile
which was being operated by the defendant Julia M.
llarney at the time of the accident, which caused the
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death of plaintiff's d1ild and that it was being used
with the consent and permission of Yon B. Barney.
It was further alleged that the insurance policy
was issued for the protection and benefit of persons
who might suffer damage through the use and operation
of the automoble and that by the terms of the policy,
the defendant was bound to defend any suit against
persons insured by said policy on account of damages
arising as aforesaid and the company further bound
itself to pay any judgment obtained in such suit against
the person insured thereunder to the extent of the in·
surance mentioned in the policy (R7).
The defendants entered their appearance by a
motion for an order striking and dismissing the amended
complaint or in the alternative, to dismiss the amended
complaint as to the def en<lant insurance company and
to strike from the ameuded complaint all reference to
said defendant and to said def en<lants' interest therein
and to any and all reference to any contract of insur·
ance (Rl2).
This motion states that it is made upon the grounds
that the defendant insurance company is not a proper
party defendant; that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the
basic cause of action alleged by plaintiff against de·
fendant Julia .M. Barne~' is in tort, that the defendant
insurance company is not a tort-feasor, that the cause
of action alleged against the defendant insurance com·
pany is in contract and that a cause of action in tort
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and in contract against different parties may not be
maintained and pursued in the same action.
Plaintiii thereafter filed a motion for production
of document wherein it mm-ed for an order that the
defendants be required to produce the policy of insurance coyering Yon B. Barney and in force on the 18th
of August, 19G± (Rl6). This motion was supported
by an affidavit of plaintiff's attorney setting forth that
one of the issues in the case was the construction of
the terms and provisions of said policy and further
asserting that the amount of the policy limits would
be material in determining the interest of the defendant
insurance company and would be of aid in settling the
above entitled lawsuit and that the plaintiff could only
obtain the policy from the defendant insurance company. The plaintiff filed interrogatories directed to
the matters concerning the insurance policy (Rl7).
The two motions came up for hearing before the
court and the court entered a judgment dismissing the
amended complaint and cause of action against the
defendant insurance company and denied plaintiff's
motion for production of the insurance policy mentioned above. The court also denied the request by
plaintiff for answers to interrogatories.

POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE
COMPANY.
5

Rule 18 (a) of the lJ tah Hules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows to wit:
"J oinder of Claims. The plaintiff in his com.
plaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim
and the defendaut in all answer setting forth a
counterclaim may joiu either as independent
or as alternate claims as many claims either legal
or equitable or both as he ma!· have against an
opposing party. There may be a like joinder
of claims when there are multiple parties if the
requirements of Rules 19. 20 and 22 are satisfied.
There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or
third-party claims if the requirements of Rules
1:3 and 14 respectiye}>· are satisfied."
Rule 18 (b) provides as follows:
"J oinder of Heme<lies; Fraudulent Convey·
ances. 'Vhenever a claim is one heretofore cog·
nizahle only after another claim has been prose·
cuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be
joined in a single action; but the court shall grant
relief in that action only in accordance with the
relative substantive rights of the parties. In
particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for
money and a claim to have set aside a convey·
ance fraudulent as to him. without first having
obtained a judgment establishing the claim for
money.''
Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil Prnccdme
prm·ides in part as follows:
"All persons may he joined in one action as
defendants if there is asserted against them
jointly, severall>·· or in the alternatiw. any right
to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
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transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences and if any question of law or
fact common to all of them will arise in the
action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be
all
interested in obtaining or defending a(J'ainst
0
the relief demanded. Judgment may be given
for one or more of the plaintiffs according to
their respective rights to relief, and against one
or more defendants according to their respective
liabilities."
These three rules are identical with the same munbered rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Considering the language of these ruies, there is
no reason why the defendant insurance company should
not be made a party to an action in which it has agreed
to pay a claim only after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion. Rule 18 (b) expressly states that
in such event the two claims may be joined in a single
action.
It is alleged in the amended complaint that the
defendant bound itself by its policy of insurance to pay
all damages which the insured became obligated to pay
because of bodily injury, including death, caused by or
arising out of the use of the automobile ref erred to in
the policy. This Court by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has established the rules which should prevail in
the trial of lawsuits in this state and we submit that the
allegations of the complaint bring the defendant within
the meaning of said rule 18 ( b) and it was proper to join
the defendant insurance company m this action.

7

The trial court refused to require the defendants
to produce the insurance policy upon which this actio 11
is based, so we cannot determine the exact terms and
provisions of this policy.
The courts have generally held that where a policy
of insurance contains a provision that no action shall be
brought against the insurer until after the determination
of the liability of the insured by a final judgment, that
an action cannot be brought in the first instance against
the insurer until the determination above indicated has
been made. See annotation at 159 A.L.R. 763.
\Ve do not know whether or not this policy contains
a "no action clause" but even if it does, we still believe
this case is distinguishable from those holding the defen·
dant insurance company as not a proper party. Al·
though we have not seen the policy because of the pre·
valence of this clause, we request the Court to consider
that the policy contains such provision in order to avoid
a second appeal.
The plaintiff did not bring in the defendant com·
pany until it had taken over the defense of this case.
We submit that under such circumstances, the defendant
insurance company is in no position to assert the "no
action clause." None of the authorities have considered
this fact and the present case is distinguishable on this
ground.

In DrJJden v. Ocean A ccii!c11i ~ Guarantee Corp.,
Ltd., 138 F.2d 291 ( CC1\7 ~ J ~11.:3), the insured defen·
8

dant sought to bring into the case by third party proce..:dings his insurer in order to make him defend the
action and pay any judgment which might be rendered
against the employer.
The insurer contended that the third party complaint should have been dismissed in view of a clause
in the policy that no action would lie against the company to reconr upon any claim or for any loss unless
brought after the amount of such claim or loss should
have been fixed and rendered certain bv a fimtl ;rnhment against the insurer. This contention \Vil!> rejected,
the court conceding that the insurer's argument that
inasmuch as there was no final judgment recovered
against the insured, no suit laid against the insurer
would have been sound were it not for the fact that
the policy in another part imposed the liability on the
insurer to defend in the name and on behalf of the insured any suit on account of such injury, and the court
held that in view of such additional provision, the contention could not be sustained.
...

.;

I._)

The court stated:
"Insurer also complains that the third party
complaint should haYe been dismissed because
under paragraph Se,Ten G of the policy 'No action shall lie against the Company to recover
upon any claim or for any loss * * * unless
brought after the amount of such claim or loss
either bv final judgment against this Employer
after tri.al of the issue * * * .' Since, they allege,
there is yet no final judgment, no suit lies against
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them .. Such a con1'itr~1ction would appear logical
were it not for the fact that the same policy, in
paragraph Three thereof, imposes the liability
on the insurer 'To Defen<l, in the name and 0 ; 1
beha~f of thi~ Employer, any suits or other proceedmgs which may at any time be instituted
against him on accouut of such injuries, including suits or other proceedings alleging such injuries and demanding damages or compensation
therefor, * * *.' ''
See also Rowley v. United States, UO F.Supp. 295
(Utah-1956).
In 2 Barron and Holtzoff Federal Practice and
Procedure, Page 81, Section 505, the authors have this
to say:
"The literal language of Rule 18 (b) would
seem to permit joinder of a claim against a tortfeasor with a claim against the insurer is one
heretofore cognizable only after another claim
has been prosecuted to a conclusion. It may be
argued that the 'no action' clause of the insur·
ance policy bars suit against the insurer prior to
judgment against the insured, but this very ar·
gument has been uniformly rejected by cases
holding that an insurer may be impleaded pur·
suant to Rule 14 despite the existence of a 'no
action' clause. And a significant recent decision
from the Tenth Circuit holds that where an
insurance policy proYided that the insurer was
not liable until the liability of another insurer
had been determined, hoth insurers may be sued
in one action. The court answered the argument
that the action against the insmer protected h~,
the policy provision was prematme h~· saying:
IO

'Rule 18 ( b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure covers this situation * * * .' A number
o~· ~t.ates. h~ve rul~s or. court-made policies prolub1tmg JOmder of an msurer but it is not clear
that these affect the outcome and thus must be
f?llowed ?~ .a feder.al court; similar state policies prolub1tmg actions to set aside fraudulent
co11veyances until the claimant has reduced to
judgment his money claim, and had that judgment returned unsatisfied, are held not controlling in federal court in view of Rule 18 ( b).
Even though these arguments seem unsatisfactory, the decisions, with the single exception of
the atypical Tenth Circuit case discussed above,
have refused to allow joinder of the insurer.
Undoubtedly the courts have been influenced by
the almost universal practice of keeping from
the jury the fact that a defendant carries liability
.
"
msurance.
The 10th Circuit Court case referred to is the case
of Miller.Y National Insurance Company v. Wichita
Flour :Mills Company, 257 F.2d 93 (1958).

\Ve submit that it is time for this Court to say that
the rules of civil procedure of this state prevail and that
any provisions of contracts on insurance policies must
gi,·e way to the superior position of these rules. A contract which attempts to contavene these rules certainly
is against the public policy therein set forth.
It has been held that a "no action" provision 1s
contrary to the public policy of rule 14 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and should therefore not be
euforced. See Jordan v. Stevens, 7 F.R.D. 40 (Mo. 11

1945), and ftfrLouth /'}'ft·c! Corp,

1'.

1llesta 11'lachincr 1

Cmnpan.1;, 17 Fed. Huie.-, Sen. H(a) ~:n, Case 1
(Pa. - 1952).
There is no question lli:1 l O\l'l' the years the courts
have been influenced, tis ;d(J,; 1~·:1'tcd in the above quote,
by the fad that insurance .-;l1ot1ld i•cH:r be mentioned
during the Lria1 of the case, kca use it would possibl)·
h:rn: an a<lYersc effect u 1100 t lie "1w·y
m ci th er rendcrinalo
•
a wrdict for plaintiff or :; '.Tcasit1F
it.., amount •
cJ
I-Iowc\·er, there i~, mwt I w r '; idc lo t 111s coin. Through
the years it has been my cxpcrie11ce that in cases
defended by insurance c0111pai~i'.'S. the iwmrance company in defending the case tries i:t C\Tr>- wa>· possible to
make it appear to the jury that the indi,-idual clefendant
is the one that will be liable lo pa>- lhc judgment and
will be the Yictim of a j11dgmcnt lar;,;·c or small.
Tlie insurance compall~- has the individual defen·
dant sit at the table along with any family that the
insured has and creates the ~·cehlg aLtd atmosphere that
these defendants are the oues who will pay the judgment.

YV e also belieYe that if tltese <kfendants obtain the
sympathy of the jury, it refuses lo return a yerdict
against such persons not on the facts of the case but in
sympathy. If the insurance company were made to be n
party to these cases, this type of injustice could not be
perpetrated and \P~ submit that it is more important to
preYent this type of situation from arising than to pro-
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tect the insurance company from a supposed pre-determination of the jury against such insurance company.
\Ve feel sure that trial courts have often had a
feeling of aversion to playing cat and mouse with the
jury. The court sits there knowing that the insurance
company is in fact a party defendant and is participating in the case to the extent of completely controlling
the defense, yet it must constantly be on the lookout to
prevent any mention of this fact to anyone. Many times
the attorney for the plaintiff is attempting to use sly
methods of bringing to the attention of the jury the
fact that insurance may be involved. This has been
accomplished through questions to the venire previous
to trial. It sometimes slips out during the course of the
testimony of one or more of the witnesses. The insurance
company likewise attempts in every way possible to
prevent the disclosure of the fact of insurance and of
the fact of the insurance company's participation in the
trial. As indicated abon::, it seeks to convey the inference that the individual defendant will have to pay
the judgment.
On at least one occasion the writer of this brief has
he a rel a trial court assert this feeling and a hope for
the time when everything would be brought out in the
light of day and the factual situation presented before
the jury and the contest between a plaintiff and the
defendant insurance company would be fully revealed
to the jury. It is our hope that the time for this has
now arrived in the state of Utah.

13

As has been indicated, in some cases, that in this
day and age, the fact that there is insurance in the ca~e
does not have the effect on j mies that it once had .
.Modern-day jurors are much more sophisticated than
they were several years ago. This is particularly true
in view of the campaigu that has been carried out in
adyertising on a national scale that juries sit upon the
amount of their own insurance premiums.
This thought has been expressed by Judge Hincks
in Schevling v. Johnson, 122 F.Supp. 87 (Conn. 1953) wherein he stated:
"Indeed, it is my personal opinion, based on
other cases, that the disclosure in a negligence
case of the presence of an insurer's interest tends
to make a jury conscious of the impact of ver· •
diets on insurance premiums and hence tends
to emphasize the importance of the jury func·
tion. Such a result, obviously, is not prejudicial
to insurers. Nor is it destructive of justice to
plaintiffs. Justice does not require that lawsuits
shall he torn from their context in contemporary
life and be tried in au artifically produced
yacuum. Occasionall.\·· when the presence of an
insurance company is disclosed through its iii·
clusion as a named part.\· or through inadver·
tence and especially ·when its presence is dis·
closed through improper tactics, there may arise
need for the judge to make some reference to
the relationship between wrdicts and the struc·
ture of the insurance business in order to impress
the jury with the need for a sense of resp?~si·
bility in its verdict. But only undue cyrnc1sm
will support the thesis 1l1at knowledge of tJ1e
presf'nce of an insurer ·s interest '" ill necessanly
1
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distort a juror's judgment. I feel sure that such
knowledge was not prejudicial here."
The Utah Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965) indicates a
step in the right direction in this field. There the subject
of insurance was mentioned before the jury but the court
refused to re\·erse the case and in so doing used the
following language:
"'Ve are not so callous as to be entirely without appreciation for the position of the defendant in such circumstances, though perhaps not
quite so keenly affected as defense counsel, who
quite generally seem to have highly developed
sensibilities to the mention of the subject of
insurance, in sames instances entirelv too much
so, of which we think this is a godd example.
In our judgment there are some basic fallacies
involved in assuming that any mention of insurance automatically results in such prejudice
that a motion for a mistrial should invariably
he granted.
The first is the assumption that the jurors
are so unaware of the facts of life that they are
oblivious to the subject of insurance unless someone mentions it. They should be given credit for
beina people of average intelligence and reasonably0 coanizant of the realities of existence.
Among ~ther things, they drive automobiles and
are concerned with financial responsibility for
accidents that may happen. Since 1951 we have
had our financial responsibility act, the practical
effect of which is that nearly all cars are covered
by insurance and the popular belief seems to be
tirnt it is compulsory.

15

, I~1 a pp.lying the law to the everyday affairs
o.± 11£e it is the duty of the courts to be as praehcal and realistic as possible and to keep abreast
of changing times. For that reason, and because
it has become the almost universal custom to
carry insurance, they are not nearly so appre·
hensive that mention of this subject in the presence of the jury will be prejudicial as they formerly were."
In a footnote the Court noted that Texas without
statutory authorization has permitted joinder of the
insurance company and Louisiana and 'Visconsin have
statutes permitting such joinder. The Court referred to
authorities supporting the tendency generally toward
disclosure of the truth in reganl to insurance.
The defendant insurance company also contended
that there could be no joinder because there was no
privity between plaintiff and the defendant insurance
company, however, in third party beneficiary cases, such
actions are allowed.
In Utah it is well established that a person for
whose benefit a contract is made, may sue on the con·
tract without having been a party to the contract or to
the consideration. M ontgorncry v. S pcncer, 1.5 Utah 495,
50 P. 623, Brown v. JYlarkland, rn Utah 360, 52 P. 597,
Srnith ti. Bowuwn, 32 Utah 33, 88 P. 687. The reason
for this rule is to avoid a multiplicity of suits and that
the decree judgment should finally and completely <le·
termine the rights of all persons having interest in the
event of the suit.
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The defendant insurance company also contended
that claims for tort contract cannot be joined, however,
under the above quoted rules, a great deal of liberality
is permitted in the joinder of claims. See 2 Barren &
Holtzoff ('Vright Edition), Page 75, Section 504.
A further argument for joinder is that there is a
common question of law and fact as against each of the
plaintiffs. That is, the liability and amount thereof so
far as the individual is concerned and the insurance
company by being a party, will be bound by this determination and such finding is one of the necessary conditions upon which liability of the insurance company
is based.
We submit that plaintiff here presents a proposition which has not yet been ruled upon and that is that
the status that the insurance company should be permitted to assume after it has taken over the defense of
the case. It is our contention here that this brings them
into court and in all honesty and fairness, requires that
their presence be disclosed.
Also under the foregoing rules, any argument
against such joinder appears to be unsatisfactory and
the Court should now rule that truth should out in the
trial of these negligence cases.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
PRODUCTION OF THE INSURANCE POLICY.
17

The action so far as the insurance company is c011 .
cerned was based upon this insurance policy. The Court
and plaintiff are uninformed as to the contents of thi.1
document and must guess at its provisions althougi
generally we know what these policies usually contain.
"Te are unable to even tell whether or not there is, in
fact, a "no action" clause in this policy. How a documeul
upon which an action is based can be irrelevant and im·
material, is a little hard to understand. There is no
privilege invoked and it should ha \'e been produced.

1

Even though the action were not on the policy,
many authorities holcl that it should he produced in
order that the plaintiff could know the extent of the
interest of the insurallce company awl that it might
1
also be helpful in the settlement of the case. See the
annotation in 41 A.L.R. :2d illi8 awl the supplemental
decisions thereto found in 4 ..t\..L.U. :!d later case senice,
page 756 .
.Admittedly there is a split of authority upon this
proposition.

'Ve submit that the defendant should be required
to produce the insurance policy.
POINT III
A REFUSAL TO .JOIN THE DEFEN·
DANT INSURANCE COMP,_\NY YIOLA'fES
THE CONSTITUTION AL RIGHTS OF THE
PLAINTIFF VNDER THE UT.AH AND THE
CNITED ST .ATES CONSTITUTIONS.
18

The Court should heed the admonition contained
111 the Constitution of the State of Utah Article I
'
'
Section 27, wherein it states:
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual
rights * * * ."
An individua 1 plaintiff in these cases is opposed
by an insurance company with all its resources. It is
not a contest between the plaintiff and the nominal
defendant. To hide this fact and not let it be brought
out into the open, violates the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution in that it abridges the privileges of a citizen of the United States, deprives him of
property without due process of law and does not afford
to him the equal protection of the laws. See also Sections 7, 10 and 11 of Article I of the Constitution of
the State of Utah relating to due process, trial by jury
and open courts.

Freedom of access to the courts and the guarantees
of equal justice and equal privileges and immunities and
fair trial by due process of law and right to trial by jury
of issues of fact are infringed if the courts permit a
party who is a real party defendant in interest to come
in in disguise or behind a shield and take over and con·
trol defense of an action against another party. Con·
tractual clauses purporting to give such a right cannot
be upheld. To allow a party to circumvent constitutional
or statutory provisions by contract in advance violates
a fundamental principle of Magna Charta, "'Ve will
rlcny to no man either justice or right."

19

''Among the priYileges and immunities of citj.;
zenship is included the right of access to the
~ourts for the purpose of bringing and maintain.
mg actions. Thi'; includes the right to employ the
usual remedies for the enforcement of personal
rights in actions of ewry kind-a right which
cannot be abrogated or eYen suspended. It has
been said that the right to sue awl def end in the
courts is one of the highest and most essential
privileges of citizenship." 16 Am. Jur. 2d 838,
Sec. 481.

1

The right to a fair and imvartial trial and the right:
to proceed by due process comes within the protection I
of the .Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti·
tution. The right is violated if a person who is obligated
to pay the judgment, and is therefore the real party i
defendant in interest, is permitted to come in and take
control of defense of the action and plaintiff is denied
the right to make such a person a party defendant. 'fhr
right is violated if an insurance company is permitted'
to conceal its interest and conduct the defense in the
name of an insolvent defendant and justify such action•
by the claim that juries cannot he trusted to be impartial
with insurance companies. De11ia l of jury trial against,
a defendant which is the real party <lefeudant in interest
is a denial of due process and a denial of equal protec·
tion of the laws and of equal access to the courts.
The protection of the Fourteenth Amendment ex·
tends not only to protection against the legislative
power of the states hut also to the jmlicial and executiw
powers.
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CONCLUSION
We submit that it is time for this Court to bring
honesty and fair play into the trial of lawsuits, particularly iu a case where the insurance company has already
come in and taken over the defense of the case.
We submit that the court erred in granting the
motion of the defendants and in denying the motion to
produce of the plaintiff.
The case should be returned for trial on the
amended complaint as it now stands.
Respectfully submitted,
WILL L. HOYT and
RA, VLINGS, Y{ALLACE, :ROBERTS
& BLACK
1

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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